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Tort Law: Mitchell v. Buchheit

Wrongful Death of Minors: Missouri Ends the Fiction
Adherence to the principle of stare decisis produces stability and predictability, but when precedent perpetuates a rule outmoded by time and reason,
fiction and injustice result. "It is revolting," Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. once
commented, "to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid
down in the time of Henry IV."I Unfortunately, the treatment of wrongful death
cases involving minors illustrates such blind imitation of the past. Prior to the
Missouri Supreme Court's decision in Mitchell v. Buchheit,2 Missouri courts
limited recovery of parents seeking damages for the wrongful death of their
minor children to the value of the child's services to the parents during his
minority. Probable expenses of rearing the child, including support, education
and medical care were deducted from the parents' recovery.3 Parents of minor
children could not, however, recover for services reasonably expected after the
child's twenty-first birthday, even though parents of adult children were permitted such recovery.
This rule, when Missouri courts carved it from the state's first wrongful
death statute: was defendable. The rule reflected the mores and legal standards
of the time, when employment of children was common and acceptable and a
child's pecuniary contributions frequently were substantial and probable. 5 The
rule, however, became a fiction in a modem context. Today, public policy opposes child labor,s and children's contributions to their parents rarely exceed the
estimated $20,000 to $33,000 it costs to raise a child to age 18. 7 Nonetheless, prior
to Mitchell, Missouri courts tenaciously adhered to the rule even while acknowledging that it was "subject to criticism on the basis of logic . . . . "8 The fiction
finally ended with the supreme court's decision in Mitchell that parents seeking
damages for the wrongful death oftheir child may establish "a reasonable probability of pecuniary benefit from the continued life of [the] child beyond the
age of minority."9 With the Mitchell decision, Missouri joined the majority of
1. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REv. 457, 469 (1897).
2. 559 S.W.2d 528 (Mo. 1977).
3. Oliver v. Morgan, 73 S.W.2d 993 (Mo. 1934).
4. Mo. REv. STAT. ch. LI, § 4 (1855), which stated in part:
[lJn every such action, the jury may give such damages as they may deem fair and just,
not exceeding five thousand dollars, with reference to the necessary injury resulting from
such death, to the surviving parties who may be entitled to sue, and, also, having regard
to the mitigating or aggravating circumstances attending such wrongful act, neglect or
default.
5. The 1900 U.S. census reported 26% of males 10 to 15 years of age, or 1.3 million, and 10.2%,
or almost 500,000, of females the same age were gainfully employed. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
TWELITH CENSUS OF THE UNITED STATES: OCCUPATIONS, Table LITI (1904).
6. 29 U.S.C. §§ 203(1), 212 (1961) and Mo. REv. STAT. § 294.021 (1969) prohibit gainful employment of any kind for children under 14 years of age. Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 294.011-.040 (1969) restrict
the hours and type of employment for those 14 to 16 years of age.
7. Reed & McIntosh, Costs of Children, ECONOMIC AsPECTS OF POPULATION CHANGE 337 (E.
Morss and R. Reed eds. 1972); Anderson v. Lale, 216 N.W.2d 152, 156-58 (S.D. 1974).
8. Collins v. Stroh, 426 S.W.2d 681, 686 (Mo. App. 1968).
9. Mitchell v. Buchheit, 559 S.W.2d 528, 533 (Mo. 1977).
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state court decisions and legislative enactments in this area. IO
It is reasonable to expect the ruling to increase future awards in wrongful
death cases involving minors. However, because of the courts' prior attempts to
soothe the harshness of the previous premajority-contributions-only rule, the
increase may be small. Prior to Mitchell, the courts had permitted sizeable
judgments in an effort to avoid the harsh consequences of the previous rule. In
addition, the ruling may have only minimal impact on the criteria the courts
will allow jurors to use for determining damages. Standards used in the only
Missouri case prior to Mitchell permitting recovery of after-majority contributions generally mirrored those used in states already allowing such recovery. II
Apparently, extensive development of case law precedent will be unnecessary.
Although Missouri joined the majority of states which permit recovery for
after-majority contributions, the Mitchell court declined to follow a strong trend
allowing recovery of such nonpecuniary losses as society, companionship, grief
and mental anguish. The court did not, however, preclude such recovery. The
supreme court merely set the issue aside as one "not raised on appeal, "12 therefore avoiding the compelling arguments for permitting recovery of nonpecuniary
losses.

THE CASE
The parents of Sidney Mett Mitchell, 19 years and 10 months of age,
brought a wrongful death action arising out of a February 3, 1971 traffic accident. The youth was unmarried and living with his parents when he was killed
in a collision between the dump truck he was driving and the defendant's
tractor-trailer rig. He had earned $1176.21 before his death and had voluntarily
contributed a minimum of $40 a week to his parents. In addition, he frequently
purchased family groceries and performed chores around the house and farm.
The youth owned his own automobile and paid for its insurance. Trial testimony
indicated that he had never expressed an intention of getting married or leaving
his parents' home. 13
The jury awarded the plaintiff parents $12,500 but they appealed the trial
court's ruling that restricted evidence of damages to the one year and two month
period from the decedent's death to his twenty-first birthday. Plaintiff's counsel
argued on appeal that it was:
[Plure nonsense to require a conclusion as a matter of law that on his 21st
birthday he would have packed his belongings, left the home, abandoned his
parents and ceased all contributions when he had so regularly and unselfishly
given the same as a matter of desire rather than legal obligation in the past.
There being substantial evidence that his contributions and services would certainly continue into the future, beyond the age of majority, the jury's verdict is
10. The majority comprises Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, District of Columbia,
Illinois, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Dakota,
Texas, Utah, Vermont and Wisconsin. Id. at 533-34.
11. Collins v. Stroh, 426 S.W.2d 681 (Mo. App. 1968).
12. Mitchell v. Buchheit, 559 S.W.2d 528, 533 (Mo. 1977).
13. Brief for Respondent at 3,4, Mitchell v. Buchheit, 559 S.W.2d 528 (Mo. 1977).
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inadequate because they were illegally refused the opportunity to consider such
future damages. 14

The supreme court agreed and ordered a new trial on damages including "the
reasonable probability of pecuniary benefit from the continued life of said child
beyond the age of minority."15

HISTORICAL BASIS OF THE COURT'S RULING
The rule restricting recovery to the decedent's premajority contributions
originated, but was not explained, in Rains v. St. Louis, Iron Mountain &
Southern Railway CO.18 Later, in Parsons v. Missouri Pacific Railway CO.,.7 the
court reasoned that since Missouri's wrongful death statute l8 did not allow parents to recover for the death of their adult child, recovery for a minor child
should also be restricted to the child's minority. The reason for prohibiting
recovery for adult children, the court said, was the lack of legal obligation
between the child and the parents. The court interpreted the wrongful death
statute's reference to "necessary injury" as indicating that damages are to be
measured by a "reasonably certain and fixed rule growing out of the relations
existing between a parent and his minor child, and the corresponding duties,
rights, and obligations of that relation."lu In other words, parents could not
recover for after-majority contributions because the child's legal obligation to
his parents ended on his twenty-first birthday, even though there might be every
reason to believe that the child would continue to provide services to his parents.
The justification for restricting recovery to premajority contributions ended
in 1905 when the' state legislature revised the wrongful death statute to permit
administrators of a decedent's estate to initiate a wrongful death action where
the decedent was an unmarried minor and there were no parents.2O There was,
therefore, no legislative basis to justify a court's insistance upon a legal obligation between the child and his parents as a condition .precedent to recovery.
Nevertheless, instead of revising their position concerning after-majority recovery, Missouri courts began applying a dual standard-one for adult children and
quite another for minors.
The Springfield Court of Appeals correctly construed the 1905 statutory
revision as signalling an end to the requirement of a legal obligation between
14. [d. at 27.
15. Mitchell v. Buchheit, 559 S.W.2d 528, 533 (Mo. 1977).
16. 71 Mo. 164 (1879).
17. 94 Mo. 286, 6 S.W. 464 (1888).
18. Mo. REV. STAT. § 2123 (1879) had virtually the same wording as the original 1855 statute.
See note 4 supra.
It is interesting to note that in interpreting the "necessary injury" wording in the statute, the
Missouri Supreme Court commented in 1904 that the words "mayor may not include the net loss
of services, but it also covers other injuries besides loss of services. It includes loss of the comfort,
society, and love of the child." Sharp v. Nat'l Biscuit Co., 179 Mo. 553, 78 S.W. 787 (1904). However,
a later Kansas City appellate court nonetheless applied the Parsons rule. "[W]e think the statement [in the Sharp casel was inadvertently made and it doubtless was the cause of the trial court
giving the instructions complained of in the case." Marshall v. Consolidated Jack Mines Co., 119
Mo. App. 270, 95 S.W. 972 (1906).
19. Parsons v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co., 94 Mo. 286, 296, 6 S.W. 464, 467 (l8BS).
20. Mo. REv. STAT. § 5425 (1909) survives as § 537.080(3) (1969).
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a parent and child in wrongful death cases involving adult children. In such
cases, the court ruled, it was sufficient that there was "a reasonable probability
of pecuniary benefit to one from the continuing life of another."21 Oddly enough,
the court ignored the statutory revision in cases involving minors. The courts
continued applying the Parsons rule as though the legislature had never acted.
The illogical result was that if an unmarried child was wrongfully killed the day
before his twenty-first birthday, the parents were limited to recovery for one
day. If the child lived until his birthday, however, the parents were entitled to
damages for his continued life.
The courts later acknowledged the validity of arguments questioning the
rule's logic. In 1954, the supreme court hesitantly applied the Parsons rule in
McCrary v. Ogden:!2 "Whether our past interpretations of [Mo. Rev. Stat. §
537.090 (1949»),23 to the effect that recovery is limited to pecuniary loss and in
the case of an infant, to the value of services during minority only, are basically
correct, may be debatable-we have consistently so construed the section." The
St. Louis Court of Appeals was also troubled by the rule when it stated:
"[W]hile the rule has been subject to criticism on the basis of logic as well as
on the basis that such a rule seemingly conflicts with what the Missouri Supreme Court has stated to be the legislative intent of § 537.090 . . . the rule
remains in force and effect to the present time and we would be compelled to
apply it."24 Thus, although the foundation had vanished, the court blindly adhered to the rule.
The Mitchell court noted that at times the judiciary had attempted "to
avoid the harshness of the rationale of the Parsons case."25 In Mudd v. Quinn, 28
the supreme court sustained a $30,000 judgment for the parents of a girl nearly
18 years of age. The court ruled that a fatigued driver operating a truck with
faulty brakes was a sufficiently aggravating circumstance to justify the large
award. The court permitted the maximum award of $25,000 to stand in Tripp
v. Choate, 'r1 an action for the wrongful death of a 16 year-old boy. The court held
that evidence of the boy's poisoning by a chemical spray and painful death to
be aggravating enough to support the judgment.
The status of after-majority recoveries was further confused by the Missouri
Approved Jury Instruction which called only for damages which plaintiffs were
"[reasonably certain to sustain in the future] as a direct result of the death of
their child . . . . "28 The instruction did not restrict recovery to premajority
contributions. The Missouri Supreme Court Committee on Jury Instructions,
21. McCullough v. W.H. Powell Lumber Co., 205 Mo. App. 15, 216 S.W. 803 (1919).
22. 267 S.W.2d 670, 676 (Mo. 1954).
23. Wording of the statute is virtually the same as the original 1855 statute. See note 4 supra.
The Supreme Court construed the legislative intent of the statute to include admission of
evidence of mitigating or aggravating circumstances and of "pecuniary loss of every kind and
character." Steger v. Meehan, 63 S.W.2d 109, 115 (Mo. 1933).
24. Collins v. Stroh, 426 S.W.2d 681, 686 (Mo. App. 1968) (footnote omitted).
25. Mitchell v. Buchheit, 559 S.W.2d 528,533 (Mo. 1977).
26. 462 S.W.2d 757 (Mo. 1971).
27. 415 S.W.2d 808 (Mo. 1967).
28. MAl § 5.03 (West 1969). That portion of the instruction enclosed in brackets may be added
at plaintiffs option where there is evidence of future damage.
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unable to reconcile the Parsons rule with reality, settled upon a "broad pecuniary loss standard."29 In the comments accompanying the instruction, the Committee stated that it doubted whether "the Supreme Court intends to . . . limit
the recovery of a widowed mother whose only son and sole support was killed a
week before his 21st birthday. This is a question of substantive law which the
Committee cannot resolve."30 The supreme court did little, if anything, to end
the confusion when it suggested in Mudd that the parties use the required
instruction and that at the same time the defense counsel argue the Parsons rule
to the juryY
The confusion and fiction finally ended in 1973 when the Missouri General
Assembly spoke so emphatically on the issue that the Mitchell court had little
choice but to abandon the Parsons rule completely. The new statute permitted
"such damages as will fairly and justly compensate such party or parties for any
damages he or they have sustained and are reasonably certain to sustain in the
future as a direct result of such death. "32 By replacing the "necessary injury"
statutory language with language providing for recovery of damages "reasonably
certain to [be] sustain[ed] in the future," the legislature clearly indicated its
intent to extend recovery beyond minority. The Mitchell court, therefore, acknowledged that the old rule could not "stand on its own logic. "33 Aside from
its lack of statutory support, it was pure conjecture to believe that a child was
a financial asset to his parents. 34 In fact, "strict adherence to the rule could lead,
reductio ad absurdum, to the conclusion that the tortfeasor should be reimbursed for having saved the parent money."35
Now that the supreme court has ended its illogical, blind imitation of the
past, future courts must establish acceptable criteria for jurors to use in determining the reasonable probability of after-majority contributions. The standards of proof which develop, however, may not be much different than what is
already required by the Missouri courts.

CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING AFTER-MAJORITY
CONTRIBUTIONS
The Missouri Court of Appeals has granted a sketchy preview of the proof
that will be required in determining a deceased minor's probable after-majority
contributions to his parents. In Collins v. Stroh,38 the jury considered the aftermajority contributions of a minor who was two months short of her twenty-first
birthday at the time of her death. The court permitted the precedent-breaking
decision to stand because the defense counsel had failed to object and to preserve the error for appeal. Thus, the appellate court considered whether the
29.Id.
30.Id.
3!. Mudd v. Quinn, 462 S.W.2d 757, 759-60 (Mo. 1971).
32. Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.090 (1973).
33. Mitchell v. Buchheit, 559 S.W.2d 528, 533 (Mo. 1977).
34. See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
35. Decof, Damages in Actions for Wrongful Death of Children, 47 NOTRE DAME LAW. 197, 198
(1971).
36. 426 S.W.2d 681 (Mo. App. 1968).
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evidence presented was adequate to justify a $15,000 judgment for the decedent's parents. Although there was no proof that the decedent made monetary
contributions to her parents, the court held that evidence that she had a fulltime job, visited her parents once a month and during vacations, helped with
housework and cared for her 14 year-old brother when she visited was sufficient
to justify the jury's inference that her "services" would continue after majority.
"[T]he jury's award must be based, not upon direct, positive evidence,"
the Collins court stated, "but upon probabilities which the jury might reasonably find exist, considering the child's age, condition, health, mentality, personality and perspective, and the parents' ages, attitude and circumstances."37 The
court stated that jury instructions should not require application of mathematical equations, but should give jurors broad latitude. "[T]he award of damages
can rest only on considerations of the most general character and much must
be left to the common sense of the jury."38
The Collins standard is markedly similar to that employed in other states
allowing recovery for after-majority contributions. Several states permit juries
to consider the deceased minor's relations with and intention to lend assistance
to his parents. 39 A decedent's promise to aid his parents is generally admissible
into evidence!o Evidence of the parents' economic need is also admissible. 41
Missouri courts generally have admitted evidence of the parents' economic sta~
tus "because poor parents are likely to have more pressing need for, and reasonably may have more confident expectation of, future contributions by their children than would affluent parents."42 Michigan courts have also admitted evidence of the parents' economic need, reasoning that such evidence serves as an
indicator that the minor decedent would have begun working at an early age.43
Parents in a Minnesota case "possessed so little of this world's goods that there
was a reasonable possibility of their becoming dependent later," and were therefore permitted to introduce evidence oftheir financial status. 44 Courts in at least
37. Id. at 689, quoting Hornbuckle v. McCarthy, 295 Mo. 162, 243 S.W. 327 (1922).
38. Id. In a federal diversity of citizenship case applying Missouri wrongful death law, the
federal district court ruled that the plaintiff could enter into evidence the probability of the deceased
minor's after-majority contributions to meet the $10,000 minimum claim requirement. The court
agreed with the plaintiffs that "the proper test is the reasonable probability of pecuniary loss
resulting from the decedent's death . . . ," and the jury "may take into consideration the probable
willingness and ability of the deceased to continue the pecuniary benefits to his parents after his
majority . . . . " Allen v. Denver-Chicago Trucking Co., 221 F. Supp. 217, 218 (W.D. Mo. 1963).
39. Sutherland v. State, 189 Misc. 953, 68 N.Y.S.2d 553 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1947); Butterfield v.
Community Light & Power Co., 115 Vt. 23, 49 A.2d 415 (1946); Rio Grande, EI Paso & Sante Fe
R.R. Co. v. Dupree, 56 S.W.2d 900 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Almanzo, 22
Ariz. 431, 198 P. 457 (1928); Ptak v. Kuetemeyer, 182 Wis. 357, 196 N.w. 855 (1924); Cincinnati
St. Ry. Co. v. Altemeier, 60 Ohio 10, 53 N.E. 300 (1899).
40. Missouri Pac. Transp. Co. v. Parker, 200 Ark. 620, 140 S.W.2d 997, cert. denied, 311 U.S.
696 (1940); Sandeen v. Willow River Power Co., 214 Wis. 166,252 N.W. 706 (1934); Southwestern
Gas & Elec. Co. v. Thomas, 249 F. 325 (5th Cir. 1918). Contra, Leary v. West Jersey & S.R. Co.
Boyajian, 1 N.J. Misc. 549, 146 A. 359 (1923) (such evidence is in a sense hearsay and a mere
expression of an opinion as to the future).
41. Hildreth v. Key, 341 S.W.2d 601 (Mo. App. 1960).
42. Id. at 615 (footnote omitted).
43. Robins v. Director Gen. of Railroads, 207 Mich. 437, 174 N.W. 124 (1919).
44. Luther v. Domack, 179 Minn. 528, 229 N.W. 784 (1930).

HeinOnline -- 47 UMKC L. Rev. 126 1978-1979

1978]

MITCHELL v. BUCHHEIT

127

two states have admitted evidence of occupation of the decedent's father, since
children frequently pursue the same general class of business. 45
Courts permitting after-majority recovery have allowed sizeable judgments
even though the deceased minor was too young to have worked. 48 These courts
permitted juries to consider, in addition to evidence of a child's intent to aid
his parents, unusual skills or talents of the deceased; the child's character or
morals; his generosity, economy and thrift; and the parents' plans concerning
their child's future. 47

IMPACT OF THE MITCHELL RULING
If the Missouri courts had been faithfully adhering to the Parsons rule,

although criteria for determining damages in wrongful death cases involving
minors would remain much the same, jury awards would likely increase with
application of the Mitchell ruling. However, when a legal tradition is in direct
conflict with reality, courts frequently find covert ways to circumvent precedent
in an attempt to ensure justice. Since application of the Parsons rule had been
avoided in several Missouri decisions, the impact of the Mitchell decision on
jury awards should be only minimal.
The Mitchell court commented that "judicial efforts [had been made] to
avoid the harshness of the rationale of the Parsons case . . . ,"48 citing, among
others, the Mudd case. In these cases, the courts liberally construed provisions
in the wrongful death statutes for the jury's consideration of "the mitigating or
aggravating circumstances attending the wrongful act, neglect or default."49 In
the Mudd and Tripp cases, for example, the court upheld judgments of $30,000
and $25,000 respectively to the parents of decedents in their late teens. A comparison of the Mudd and Tripp awards with the $15,000 judgment in the Collins
case, where the jury considered only after-majority contributions, suggests that
the Mitchell ruling will have only a minimal impact on the size offuture awards.
Rather than increase the awards, the ruling may tend to stabilize the discrepancies in jury awards which resulted from judicial attempts to soothe conflicts
between the Parsons rule and notions of fair compensation.

EXTENDING MITCHELL TO INCLUDE RECOVERY OF
NONECONOMIC LOSSES
A more stabilizing effect on jury awards would be achieved by dropping the
pecuniary loss rule in favor of all-inclusive recovery.50 "Specifically, in the pecuniary and general loss states, the pecuniary loss doctrine has been softened to
allow substantial recoveries, while in the all-inclusive loss states restraint gener45. Love v. Detroit, J. & C. R. Co., 170 Mich. 1,135 N.W. 963.(1912); Fox v. Oakland Conso!.
St. Ry., 118 Cal. 55, 50 P. 25 (1897).
46. Love v. Detroit, J. & C. R. Co., 170 Mich. 1, 135 N.W. 963 (1912); Russell v. Windsor
Steamboat Co., 126 N.C. 961, 36 S.E. 191 (1900).
47. S. SPEISER, RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH § 4:31 (2d ed. 1975).
48. Mitchell v. Buchheit, 559 S.W.2d 528, 533 (Mo. 1977).
49. Mo. REv. STAT. § 537.090 (1969).
50. Finkelstein, Pickrel & Glasser, The Death of Children: A Nonparametric Statistical Analysis of Compensation for Anguish, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 884 (1974).
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ally has been exercised in assessing amounts for anguish."51 An amicus curiae 52
in the Mitchell case argued that the legislators intended all-inclusive recoveries
when they substituted "any damages" for "necessary injury" in the state's
wrongful death statute. Instead of denying the validity of the amicus' argument,
the Mitchell court set it aside, stating that the argument was "not applicable
to this case or dispositive of any issue presented by the parties."53
Prior to the state's first wrongful death statute, Missouri common law permitted recovery of nonpecuniary damages. In James u. Christy,54 the Missouri
Supreme Court recognized a father's right to recover for the lost "society and
comforts" of his deceased 15 year-old son. However, the father died before the
court rendered judgment and the justices ruled that the right to recover for loss
of society and comforts was a personal one which did not survive a parent's
death. Nonetheless, two years later the legislature abrogated the parents' right
to recover for such losses. Still, as the amicus curiae argued, there was at that
time "a statutory directive that law enacted in derogation of the common law
had to be strictly construed."55 Therefore, the court's later construction of the
statute's phrase "necessary injury" as eliminating "an existing, substantive,
common law right of a parent . . . to recover damages for tortious loss of the
society and companionship of his slain son" fell far short of the demands for
strict construction. 58
The courts missed an opportunity to correct the situation in 1955 when the
General Assembly revised the wrongful death statute to allow recovery of damages "for the death" of, in addition to the pre-existing right to damages for
"necessary injury resulting from such death."57 This arguably indicated that the
legislature intended to abandon the restriction on recovery of nonpecuniary
losses, especially in light of the 1973 statutory change permitting recovery for
"any damages."58 The supreme court failed to detect any significance in the 1955
revision and in subsequent cases failed to mention it, relying instead on pre-1955
case law authority. The legislature has clearly indicated its intent to permit
recovery for both pecuniary and nonpecuniary losses by amending the statute
to allow awards for "any damages."
Meanwhile, other states with similarly worded wrongful death statutes
allow recovery under statutes calling for "such damages as the jury may determine to be just, taking into consideration all the damages of every kind . . . . "59
California has retained its pecuniary loss rule under a statute allowing "such
51.
52.
S.W.2d
53.
54.
55.

[d. at 890.
Amicus Curiae Brief of Missouri Association of Trial Attorneys, Mitchell v. Buchheit, 559
528 (Mo. 1977) [hereinafter cited as Amicus Curiae Brief].
Mitchell v. Buchheit, 559 S.W.2d 528, 532 (Mo. 1977).
18 Mo. 162 (1853).
Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 52, at 13, Mitchell v. Buchheit, 559 S.W.2d 528 (Mo. 1977).
56. [d.
57. Mo. REv. STAT. § 537.090 (1959) stated: "[Tlhe jury may give to the surviving party or
parties who may be entitled to sue such damages. . . as the jury may deem fair and just for the
death and loss thus occasioned, with reference to the necessary injury resulting from such death
"
58. Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 52, at 16, 17, Mitchell v. Buchheit, 559 S.W.2d 528 (Mo.
1977).
59. MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-7-13 (1977); Avery v. Collins, 171 Miss. 636, 157 So. 695 (1934).
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damages . . as under all of the circumstances of the case may be just.
"80
However, the state still allows what amounts to noneconomic damages by permitting juries to attach pecuniary value to the noneconomic interests. While
California's approach would provide a means for Missouri to broaden wrongful
death recoveries to include nonpecuniary damages without abandoning its longlived commitment to the pecuniary loss rule, such an approach would perpetuate the fiction which tainted the pre-Mitchell case law.

CONCLUSION
Missouri has finally freed itself from an illogical rule lacking statutory
support. The court's struggle to rectify the rule's injustices, while at the same
time respecting the doctrine of stare decisis, illustrates the difficulties that
result when courts are compelled to adhere to case law precedent. As a result,
fiction shrouded the judiciary's treatment of wrongful death cases involving
children. The Mitchell court has begun the task of breaking these bonds, but it
will be only a halfway measure if future courts do not permit recovery of nonpecuniary damages.
The rationale for allowing recovery for damages is to right a wrong suffered.
Money is only part of the damages suffered when parents' children are killed.
The rule prohibiting recovery for the whole of damages-monetary as well as
emotional-stems from a time when courts felt noneconomic losses were imaginary and immeasurable, and therefore inappropriate. Our economic system has
changed, and along with this change has come a realization that, especially in
the case of children, money losses are the least significant damages. The General Assembly was cognizant of this fact when, in 1973, it insisted on recovery
of "any damages." Adherence to the pecuniary loss rule is, therefore, logically
and legislatively impermissible.

Paul M. Spinden
60. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 376 (West 1975).
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